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Abstract 
The UK which had been one of the major members of the EU, currently 
has been holding the status of an ‘ex-member’ following almost a four years 
of a rocky withdrawal process that took place for the first time ever in the EU 
history. This unprecedented withdrawal is likely to come up with severe 
negative outcomes particularly for the UK side in comparison to remaining in 
the Union. This study seeks to demonstrate the likely legal, political and 
economic ramifications of the British withdrawal by particularly concentrating 
on the highly critical and debated issues bargained during the withdrawal 
negotiations as well as to draw a detailed comparison of the outcomes of an 
exit under the framework of a withdrawal agreement and a no-deal scenario. 
Yet, the paper concludes that the second round of negotiations for determining 
on the terms of a future relationship might not be as less difficult than the first 
round examined in this study. 
Keywords: Brexit, the United Kingdom, the European Union, Withdrawal, 
No-deal 
 
1.  Introduction 
It’s well-known that the European Union (EU) has been challenged by 
several major crises for the last decade. Brexit is to be regarded as only one of 
them which also covers the economic, migration, governance crises as well as 
the crisis of increasing Euroscepticism. Brexit as rightfully put forward by 
Nugent (2018) is not only significant in terms of setting a precedent for 
withdrawal from the Union, however it’s also significant since the 
withdrawing country is regarded as one of the largest and most powerful 
countries of the EU (pp.54-55).  Following a membership which had fully and 
uninterruptedly continued for 47 years, the United Kingdom (UK) has finally 
left the EU at 11.00 pm on 31 January 2020. This outcome which arose after 
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a negotiating period corresponding to a political deadlock lasting for more 
than three and a half years, has attracted a lot of attention around the world. 
Everyone on that particular day, has witnessed such a cornerstone and 
historical moment that was cheerfully welcomed by the half of the country 
while was mourned by the rest. Though uncertain yet, it is inevitably expected 
to lead to considerable economic and political outcomes both for the UK and 
the EU. However, what is certain is that despite all these crises the EU has 
been undergoing, neither the citizens nor the institutions of the two sides, had 
fully understood the possibility that a Brexit might come true (Martill & 
Steiger, 2018, p.1) 
It’s indeed not the first time that the UK has decided to hold a 
referendum on the continuity of its EU membership. Immediately after its 
accession to the then European Economic Community (EEC) in 1973, the UK 
held its first referendum in 1975 on whether or not to remain in the EEC. A 
large majority of British voters corresponding to 67.23 % of the whole 
electorate chose to remain in the EEC and supported the Labour Government 
who campaigned for not leaving.1 (Martill & Staiger, 2018, p. 5) However, 
currently the words of Edward Heath stressing that “the Community the UK 
was acceding in 1973 was far more than a common market” has not been well 
remembered. Similarly, the referendum held in 1975 has been misremembered 
as merely a trade vote and not much more than that (Cliffe, 2020, p.24). 
Almost forty years after that, the former British Prime Minister David 
Cameron had announced that he would hold a second referendum on the 
British membership of the EU on June 23, 2016. He also promised to conduct 
a strong campaign for convincing British citizens to stay in the EU 
(Economist, 2016, p.7). 
According to Cini and Verdun (2018), one can assume that crisis times 
can even lead to deeper integration in the EU. This has been revealed 
following the Eurozone crisis which led to the introduction of new institutional 
structures, new institutional instruments, a new treaty and so forth. Likewise, 
the same may apply in the case of Brexit (p. 68). Yet, it’s still early to make 
clear arguments about such a broad subject on how Brexit will affect the 
European integration process. Rather than that, this study will seek to analyse 
the possible effects of Brexit on the UK from an interdisciplinary approach 
trying to focus on the likely legal, political and economic outcomes despite of 
the still-lasting uncertainties at the time of writing. Brexit has raised several 
serious questions: What were/are the major controversial issues between the 
UK and the EU even before the British referendum, during the withdrawal 
negotiations and recently? What are the outcomes of Brexit under the 
                                                        
1 1975:UK Embraces Europe in Referendum, On This Day 1950-2005. BBC News Home. 
Retrieved December 10, 2019 from 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/june/6/newsid_2499000/2499297.stm. 
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dynamics of a Withdrawal Agreement and a former no-deal scenario? This 
paper seeks to demonstrate that Brexit is likely to affect the UK in negative 
terms under each circumstance in comparison to preserving the full 
membership though it is regarded as one of the strongest and wealthiest 
Member States of the EU. The paper tries to reveal that even for such a 
powerful state, the withdrawal experience can still be such painful and long-
lasting yet full of much uncertainties, let alone other members of the EU. The 
research approach chosen in this study is largely based on a comprehensive 
literature review which is strengthened through recent official sources as well 
as the leading press agencies.  
  In that respect, the study is structured as follows: The first part of the 
study, focuses on the controversial issues raised between the UK and the EU 
before the Brexit referendum and explores whether or not there are any 
precedents for Brexit. The second part of the paper tries to figure out the likely 
legal, political and economic consequences of British withdrawal in general 
from an interdisciplinary approach. This is followed by the core part of the 
paper which tries to analyse the mostly debated controversial aspects/issues of 
the withdrawal negotiations and the bargaining process between the sides. Yet, 
the paper draws a comparison of the British exit from the EU within the 
framework of a Withdrawal Agreement as is the case now and a scenario of 
what it would have looked like if there would have been a no-deal situation 
with an aim of capturing a better understanding of the likely severe outcomes 
of the whole process. Lastly a brief analysis of the likely impact of the Covid-
19 pandemic is made in terms of the sides’ on-going negotiations for 
determining on a future trade relationship.  
 
2. Negotiations with the EU on the Way to the Brexit Referendum 
After the general elections held in the United Kingdom (UK) in 2010, 
two crucial issues arose with regard to the UK’s relations with two unions that 
the country was engaged in. One concerned the questioning of the long-lasting 
relationship of the UK with the EU while the latter one related to the issue 
whether or not Scotland should be independent from the UK (Gamble, 2012, 
p.468). 
British demands to remain in the EU before the referendum indeed 
were not considered as a big deal since the UK has long before made a choice 
between what it liked and disliked with regard to the European integration. It 
opted out from the Euro, the Schengen area, most of the provisions in the area 
of police cooperation and judicial cooperation over criminal matters and has 
exemption from the European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruling on the application 
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU as well as a special budget 
rebate due to special arrangements. Therefore, the UK has already been having 
European Scientific Journal June 2020 edition Vol.16, No.17 ISSN: 1857-7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857-7431 
4 
a beneficial status which is commonly referred to as ‘having the best of both 
worlds’ (Emerson, 2016, pp.2-5). 
Before the negotiations between the UK and the EU were concluded, 
there was also the option of a ‘half-membership’ of the EU which was put on 
the agenda by some politicians particularly Boris Johnson. This alternative 
included a new type of membership in which the UK could remain in the EU 
by holding a special status. In that regard, the country was supposed to 
continue to have full access to the Internal Market and participate in the 
decision-making process of the Union as well as retaining the right to opt out 
of what it disliked at the EU level. The biggest problem of that alternative was 
that it necessitated the revision of the EU Treaties in order to allow granting 
such a special status to one of the Member States since the current Treaties do 
not allow any such possibilities (Piris, 2016, p.3). However, this option 
seemed quite risky in many aspects since it would have required the common 
agreement of all the Member States which accordingly was to be followed by 
the ratification processes in accordance with the Member States’ constitutional 
requirements. Piris (2016) truly argues that even if one had ignored the 
complexity of the ratification procedures, still it would have taken years for 
all the members to go through this process. What’s more, such a ‘pick and 
choose’ approach probably would not have been welcomed by some Member 
States which had considered the EU benefits and duties as a single package. 
This could also have led to the conclusion that the other EU-sceptic countries 
might have asked for the same status (p.3).   
Cameron’s negotiations with the EU covered four fundamental issues. 
Keeping in mind that the UK since the early 2000’s -as a country that neither 
participated to the European Monetary Union (EMU) nor did hinder its 
introduction- was advocating that the EU should recognize that it encompasses 
more than one currency. According to the UK, the EU should avoid 
approaching prejudicial towards the Member States who still have been 
preserving their national currencies (Cini & Verdun, 2018, p.69). Therefore, 
the first key matter was related to the UK’s concerns to protect the city of 
London against financial market legislation which was decided by the 
eurozone majority of the Council. Since the UK was not a eurozone country, 
this was considered to be likely to lead to discriminatory results to the 
detriment of the city. Hence the UK demanded some necessary measures to be 
taken by the European Commission to assure the prohibition of discrimination 
between euro and non-euro economic actors (Emerson, 2016, p.4). In that 
respect, Cameron had asked for a mechanism which would give any non-
eurozone country the opportunity to halt the new legislation’s decision-
making process with regard to eurozone. Surprisingly his offer was accepted 
with the condition that only one non-eurozone country might have delayed this 
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process to push for a further debate about any problematic eurozone legislation 
(Rankin, 2016). 
The second one was linked to the competitiveness which covered the 
decrease of the red tape and the administrative burdens while leading to a 
better regulation that the European Commission has been working for. This 
also necessitated the repeal of unnecessary legislation as well as the conduct 
of a more aggressive trade policy which included the extension of the EU’s 
liberalising trade agreements to the US, Japan, Latin America and Asia-Pacific 
countries that was also likely to serve to British interests (Emerson, 2016, p.4). 
The third issue focused on the sovereignty and the ‘ever-closer union’ 
idea which raised distressful concerns on the UK that the European integration 
was proceeding continuously towards a federal mechanism. Hence, the UK 
was guaranteed that the ‘ever-closer union’ phrase should not be considered 
as a legal basis for a further constitutional change. What’s more, the country 
asked for the recognition that it was not willing to proceed with any deeper 
political integration and that not all the EU Member States were obliged to 
pursue a common goal with regard to the integration (Emerson, 2016, p.4). 
The UK this time sought for a stronger guarantee than what had already been 
agreed by the Member States as a special formula of wording in June 2014 
that “not all the Member States were on the road to integration” and the EU 
leaders accepted this recognition (Rankin, 2016). This was indeed 
unsurprising since the UK is always regarded to be the voice of opposition and 
scepticism when it came to further integration matters of the Union (Cini & 
Verdun, 2018, 67). The UK also demanded the introduction of a new ‘red card’ 
mechanism to be built on the existing ‘yellow’ and ‘orange’ card mechanisms 
which strengthen the role of the national parliaments in the EU decision-
making procedure (Emerson, 2016, p.4). Departing from the fact that the 
yellow card mechanism was used very rarely, the red-card mechanism was 
also criticized for how likely it was to be invoked. However, it was mainly 
sought to be introduced to built up alliances among the Member States for 
effectively blocking a Commission proposal (EU Reform Deal, BBC News, 
2016). 
The last issue pointed out by the UK was regarded as a sensitive one 
which related to the social benefits provided to intra-EU migrants. The UK 
asked for measures to be taken to tackle the so called ‘benefit tourism’ without 
damaging the free movement rights and the principle of non-discrimination on 
grounds of nationality. This measure was referred to as a new ‘alert and 
safeguard mechanism’ or ‘an emergency brake’. It was to be invoked in cases 
of high inflow of workers causing excessive pressure on the proper 
functioning of the public services in some particular Member States (Emerson, 
2016, p.4). Cameron had asked for a four-year freeze on the social benefits of 
the European citizens working in the UK. However, through the end of the 
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summit, he accepted that the emergency break would only cover the new 
comers. Furthermore, his demand for keeping the emergency break in force 
for thirteen years was accepted only for seven years corresponding to a period 
which the UK had conducted an open-door policy to the nationals of Central 
and Eastern Member States when most of the other Western European 
countries had closed their labour markets in 2004 (Rankin, 2016). 
Cameron and the EU leaders had finally reached an agreement at the 
European Council held on 18-19 February 2016 on these four requests put 
forward by Cameron’s government for ensuring the UK’s remaining in the EU 
(Emerson, 2016, p.1). However, it was the referendum which had the final say 
on whether or not the UK should have continued to remain as a member of the 
EU. The turnout for the referendum was 72.2 %. The outcome was striking 
that the British people chose to leave the EU with a 51.9 % of voters voting to 
leave corresponding to 17.410.742 votes while a 48.1 % of voters choosing to 
remain in the EU with 16.142.241 votes. It is crucial to note that in Northern 
Ireland and Scotland, the remain side was overwhelming whereas in England 
and Wales, the leave side was prevailing (EU Referendum Results, BBC 
News, 2020). 
David Cameron resigned and his successor Theresa May was expected 
to trigger Article 50 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) for 
the start of an official withdrawal from the Union (Martill & Staiger, 2018, 
p.6). However, the UK Supreme Court decided in case Miller2 that an act of 
the UK Parliament was necessary for authorising the government to trigger 
Article 50 TFEU. In that regard, the UK Parliament passed the European 
Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Act 2017 on 13 March which received the 
royal assent from the Queen on 16 March 2017 (Carmona, et al. 2017, p.3). 
Hence, the official letter for British withdrawal was submitted to the EU on 
29 March 2017 (Martill & Steiger, 2018, p.6). 
Coe (2019) rightfully questions to what extent the Brexit referendum 
primarily concerned the vote for the UK’s full membership in the EU. The 
polls recorded before the referendum revealed that though this referendum 
targeted the UK’s full membership, the Brits implicitly were more concerned 
about matters related to immigration, financial crisis, housing, education, 
health and welfare which were well marketed and easily filled with populist 
discourses (p.34). Hence a considerable number of British citizens carried 
their dissatisfactions to the poll while Cameron was strongly advocating in 
favour of remaining.  
 
 
                                                        
2 Judgement of the UK Supreme Court of 24 January 2017, R (on the application of Miller 
and another) (Respondents) v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union (Appellant).  
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3. Any Precedents for Brexit? 
The only precedents which shed some light and reveal some possible 
consequences of withdrawal from the EU are Algeria’s and Greenland’s 
withdrawals from the European Community (EC) in 1962 and 1985, 
respectively. Algeria became a member of the EC as a part of France. The 
country went into a war of independence that lasted for eight years and finally 
reached its independence after which it withdrew from the EC (Patel, 2018, 
p.115). Immediately after its withdrawal, Algeria sought for some ways to 
preserve the existing EC legislation in its national legal system and still was 
treated as a Member State for some time. However, during the 1970’s, the 
country’s close ties with the EC market started to weaken on a gradual basis. 
Particularly, the protectionist feature of the EC’s common agricultural policy 
had a considerable negative impact on the wine production of the country 
which was the world’s biggest exporter during the 1960’s. In time, the EC 
started to treat Algeria like any other North African country (Patel, 2018, 
pp.116-118). 
The case of Greenland which though is not a state but a Danish 
dependency, can also give some idea on the possible effects of the withdrawal. 
Joining the EC involuntarily as an independent part of Denmark in 1972, 
Greenlanders decided to leave the EC through a referendum only ten years 
after its accession in 1982 (Patel, 2018, p.115; Berglund, 2006, pp.157-158). 
After Denmark’s proposal to the EC to grant Greenland the status of Overseas 
Countries and Territories -which was the most beneficial solution for 
Greenland- the European Commission accepted the proposal and the parties 
set a compromise about the consequences of this withdrawal. Having the status 
of Overseas Countries and Territories meant much to Greenland since it 
allowed the country still to have tariff-free access to the Internal Market for 
exporting its fish and fish products as well as receiving some limited loans 
from the EC (Berglund, 2006, p.158). In return, the EC Member States led by 
Germany were granted the right of fishing in Greenlandic waters. Hence, the 
Fisheries Agreement concluded between the sides, ended the negotiations of 
Greenland’s withdrawal from the EC. Yet, it can be argued that the terms of 
withdrawal were still beneficial rather than costly for Greenland to leave the 
EC (Berglund, 2006, p.159). 
Both in the Algerian and Greenlandic cases, the two countries while 
seeking for their full sovereignty and independence on one side, they still 
searched for ways to preserve their close links to the EC particularly due to 
economic reasons. What is also to be underlined in both cases is that the 
intention of accession to the EC belonged to the motherlands of those 
countries. People of neither Algeria nor Greenland could deliver their 
independent decisions on whether or not acceding to the EC (Patel, 2018, 
pp.115-116). Yet, the situation of the UK is completely different from those 
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two cases. It became a Member State as a fully independent country acting on 
its own peoples’ will.  
 
4. Some Concerns about Possible Political and Legal Aspects of 
Withdrawal  
Though it’s been four years after the referendum, still the 
consequences of the British withdrawal from the EU yet remain unclear and 
go no further than estimations through legal, economic and political aspects. 
However, it’s certain that the withdrawal from the Union will inevitably have 
far-reaching political, legal and economic consequences both from the 
perspectives of the withdrawing Member State as well as the remaining 
members of the EU.  
As pointed out by Emerson (2016), immediately after the withdrawal, 
the Treaties shall cease to apply to the withdrawing state as laid down under 
Article 50 TFEU. This corresponds to an EU legislation comprising around 
5000 regulations, directives and decisions with regard to the Internal Market 
and almost 1100 international treaties concluded between the EU and the third 
countries (p.6). However, it does not seem possible that this wide category of 
EU legislation would automatically be repealed and deleted from the British 
legal system since they were transposed to national legislation and have been 
implemented by the British judiciary during full membership (p.6). Hence, a 
repeal of the 1972 British European Communities Act within the exit day 
would necessitate the British legislator to enact new laws to fill such an 
extensive legal gap (Piris, 2016, p.12). Nicolaides (2013) reminds that the 
withdrawal from the EU does not necessarily bring together an obligation to 
change all the national legal system of the withdrawing country. In other 
words, it would be up to the choice of the withdrawing country whether or not 
to keep the relevant EU legislation in force in its national legal system. If it 
would be to the interest of the withdrawing country to continue applying the 
EU standards in a policy field such as environment, it shall keep the relevant 
legislation (p.215). Besides, the UK would also need to set up new 
mechanisms or institutions to replace particularly the tasks of the European 
Commission in areas which it enacts new national rules and policies (p.216). 
Yet, the practical realities with regard to legal changes indeed seem to be 
highly problematic in that regard.  
Referring to Apolte’s recognition of ‘withdrawal from the Union’ as 
‘secession’ (Apolte, 1997) Berglund, in her analysis questions whether or not 
such a withdrawal from the EU has common characteristics with ‘the right of 
secession’ under international law. According to Berglund (2006), the concept 
of secession particularly includes claims to territory and therefore might not 
be sufficiently appropriate to invoke in a withdrawal situation. Still, she 
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accepts that secession might show similar characteristics to a withdrawal case. 
(pp.154-155). 
Therefore, focusing on the secession literature and some common 
points thereof, she draws out five issues to be analyzed in case of a withdrawal 
from the EU. These can be listed as territory, legitimacy of leaders, fear of 
fragmentation, lost investment and costs to be borne by all sides. However, 
three issues are of significant concern when the EU is considered. The first 
one is the fear of fragmentation which Berglund argues that a withdrawal from 
the Union by a particular Member State is likely to lead to the follow up of 
others. In that context, the writer argues that such a move would be risky in 
terms of becoming the starting point of a possible breakdown of the EU. 
According to the writer, the stronger the withdrawing Member State is, the 
heavier the fear of fragmentation is to be felt among the EU members 
(Berglund, 2006, p.155 and p.162). That’s one of the reasons why the EU 
Member States would seek to guarantee that the UK would not get a too good 
deal with the EU according to some arguments put forward immediately after 
the British referendum (Cini & Verdun, 2018, p. 68). Currently, four years 
after the referendum, it seems that there exist no such risks related to the follow 
up of any EU 27 Member States. Though there are no short-term signals for 
any such effect, still the Brexit referendum constitutes a serious challenge to 
the EU integration and there is always the risk that such effects might rise at 
some point in the future (Cini & Verdun, 2018, p.68). 
It’s noteworthy that the withdrawal of such a major Member State is 
likely to jeopardize the European integration project and affect negatively the 
international political actorness of the EU (Berglund, 2006, pp.162-163). 
Apart from that, Emerson (2016) argues that the UK also has a lot to lose in 
terms of its foreign policy due to the withdrawal. It’s well-known that the UK 
had always been retaining its freedom to act independently from the EU when 
it came to foreign policy matters. Moreover, the US as well as China had even 
declared that they would have preferred the UK to remain in the EU (p.21). 
Another point raised by Berglund (2006) to take place in withdrawal 
cases concerns the effects of Europeanization. It’s known that most of the EU 
Member States have introduced several policy changes or legal amendments 
in order to become a full member to the Union. This even required some 
constitutional amendments in several Member States. Therefore, the 
withdrawal is likely to affect the system created by the Europeanization 
process in that particular Member State. It will not be wrong to assume that 
the withdrawal might be more difficult and challenging for an old Member 
State such as the UK which has long absorbed and internalized the 
Europeanization process throughout its full membership in comparison to a 
newly welcomed state (pp.156-157). 
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Thirdly, there exists the lost investment issue which corresponds to the 
investments such as the infrastructural or the industrial contributions made by 
the remaining state within the territory of the seceding state. However, this can 
be solved through a compromise that may satisfy both parties and this issue is 
not likely to be of great concern in Brexit case since the EU investments are 
generally limited in scope (Berglund, 2006, p.156).  
It is also noteworthy that the withdrawing state faces the risk of the 
decrease of both education and employment opportunities to be exercised by 
its citizens living in other Member States following the withdrawal (Berglund, 
2006, p.162). When the UK abandons the free movement of persons, it will 
have negative effects both on the EU citizens living in the UK as well as the 
British citizens who have been residing in other EU Member States on a 
reciprocal basis. Normally, both citizen groups shall be subject to the need to 
take work permits for a further settlement in the host countries which will take 
quite long time and extra procedures. EU citizens engaged in several group of 
professions ranging from unqualified to qualified shall no more find any 
opportunities as easy as earlier in the British labour market which inevitably 
is to be affected by this situation. In that regard, British labour market is likely 
to turn out to be less flexible while covering a narrower group of skills in 
comparison to past (Emerson, 2016, p.11). What’s more, not only individuals 
but also companies both belonging to the UK and other EU countries are 
assumed to be suffering from the same disadvantage (Piris, 2016, p.12). 
Another disadvantageous situation concerns the generous social 
security arrangements implemented for British retirees living abroad 
particularly in the Mediterranean region. It is assumed that those retirees who 
are heavily dependent on this system in terms of services such as health care 
shall no longer be able to demand the implementation of EU norms in that 
regard. Likewise, British students studying abroad in Europe are also likely to 
be affected. Taking into consideration the significant role the UK plays within 
the EU education system as well as the European wide academic research pool, 
the outcome of abandoning the free movement of people is likely to cause 
similar negative effects for British universities as well. Accordingly, the 
Erasmus programme for education and the Horizon 2020 programme for 
academic research are also likely to be affected negatively (Emerson, 2016, 
pp.11-12). 
Emerson (2016) even goes further by putting forward the possibility 
of the UK asking for visas with regard to EU citizens in order to hinder the 
pressure of immigration which might emerge on a reciprocal basis (p.12) 
though it appears as a small possibility. Yet most of these issues related to the 
situation of both sides’ citizens are already regulated under the withdrawal 
agreement (Piris, 2016, p.12).  
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5. Some Concerns about Possible Economic Costs of Withdrawal 
Economic costs are highly significant for both sides when it comes to 
the withdrawal case. As Emerson (2016) truly puts it, the political, institutional 
and the legal consequences of the withdrawal are more likely to be predicted 
in comparison to economic results which yet remain unclear (p.6). This shall 
also largely depend on the terms of the future trade relationship between the 
sides. However, following such a withdrawal, the costs borne are likely to be 
higher for the part which is poorer than the other side in terms of economic 
conditions. Berglund (2006) argues that in cases of secession, where the 
seceding state is less wealthy and in need of receiving financial contributions 
from the remaining state, the seceding state might face economic difficulties 
upon secession. However, if the opposite is the case where the seceding state 
is richer and a net-contributor to the remaining state, then the remaining state 
might not be willing to allow the other’s secession (p.156). 
If this assumption is applied to the case of a withdrawal from the EU, 
then it’s likely that the costs will arise depending on whether the withdrawing 
Member State is a net receiver of EU funds or a net contributor. In that regard, 
a net receiver state is likely to lose the aids to be achieved from the EU while 
a net contributor is likely to benefit from this situation. Taking British 
withdrawal into account, the UK is to be regarded as a net contributor to the 
EU budget. However, following the withdrawal, the UK shall no more be 
obliged to contribute to the three most costly EU policies namely the common 
agricultural policy, the regional policy and the research policy. Yet, this shall 
also mean that British farmers, British researchers and the less developed 
regions will no more be able to benefit from the EU funds (Nicolaides, 2013, 
p.216). From the EU side, loosing such a major contributor to the common 
budget will lead to serious questions like which country would be filling this 
gap instead. Paterson (2018) in that regard points out to the lonely position of 
Germany which is expected to finance the gap as the largest and wealthiest 
country in the EU (p.92). 
The costs to be born also shall differ depending on whether or not the 
withdrawing Member State takes place in the European Monetary System 
(EMU).  In that context, it shall face the costs of reconstituting its national 
currency (Berglund, 2006, p.162). However, this shall not appear in the case 
of British withdrawal since the UK is already not a member of the EMU and 
the Eurozone.   
According to Berglund (2006) the costs of loss of access to the Internal 
Market could be high for the withdrawing Member State. The costs are 
expected to be higher in cases where the dependency of that state on the EU 
area is high in terms of its exports and imports (p.162). Taking into 
consideration the relationship between the UK and the EU, one has to note that 
the EU is the UK’s largest trade partner. UK exports to the EU amounting to 
European Scientific Journal June 2020 edition Vol.16, No.17 ISSN: 1857-7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857-7431 
12 
a trade volume of £ 289 billion corresponded to 46 % of all UK exports by 
2018. On the other hand, UK imports from the EU amounted to £ 345 billion 
and held a share of 54 % among all UK imports for the same year (Statistics, 
House of Commons, 2019). Hantzsche, Kara and Young (2019) estimate that 
the GDP (Gross Domestic Product) per capita of the UK and accordingly the 
economic growth of the country by 2030 are likely to be lower under each 
scenario after Brexit in comparison to the lost alternative of preserving the EU 
membership (pp.5-6). 
Another point to be highlighted is that due to withdrawal, the UK is 
likely to lose its beneficial position with regard to London’s role in the EU 
financial market and the foreign direct investment (FDI) it attracts from the 
rest of the world (Emerson, 2016, p.9). Particularly, the situation linked to the 
financial markets is of significant value since the financial center of the Euro 
would probably be changed into another leading city other than London which 
would already be located in the Eurozone after such a withdrawal (Emerson, 
2016, p.15).  The name of Frankfurt -as the city hosting the European Central 
Bank- is frequently discussed and considered most probably to replace London 
as the financial center under such a circumstance despite the counter opinions 
(Mc Grath, 2018; Bicer, 2019). 
 
6.  Exiting from the EU within a Withdrawal Agreement 
Before the start-up of the official negotiations between the EU and the 
UK, there were several debates among scholars with regard to how these 
negotiations might have proceeded. According to Emerson (2016) it was more 
likely that the UK could have been trying to negotiate a pleasing deal for tariff-
free trade without full access to the Internal Market, particularly by 
abandoning the free movement of people and persuading the EU for a selective 
inclusion in the Internal Market. Emerson called this a ‘subtraction method’ 
in which the seceding country chose the beneficial parts of the Internal Market 
rules while putting the irritating ones aside (pp.9-10). 
The same method was called as a kind of ‘pick and choose’ model by 
Piris which was indeed similar to a ‘half-membership’ model (Piris, 2016, 
pp.5-6). However, Emerson (2016) argued that the EU, particularly the 
Commission would not have been much willing to conclude such a deal with 
the UK since the withdrawal would put the EU into difficulty by creating a 
reputational damage. What’s more, the EU would most probably abstain from 
showing an impression to the other Member States that such a withdrawal case 
would not be as difficult and costly as it would have seemed. This method was 
also referred to as ‘cherry picking’ in the EU environment. However, as 
observed from the negotiations conducted between Switzerland and the EU 
after the Swiss referendum held in 2014 to abandon the free movement of 
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people, this was indeed something which the EU had not been seeking for, 
since the EU always considers all the EU policies in unity (pp.10-11).  
The official withdrawal negotiations between the UK and the EU 
started on 19 June 2017 and lasted up until 29 March 2019 during Theresa 
May’s government (Martill & Staiger, 2018, p.6). A withdrawal agreement 
was eventually reached by May’s government and the EU on 25 November 
2018 alongside a political declaration on the future relationship adopted by the 
parties on the same date. These two documents which are revised afterwards, 
were to be evaluated together on the common basis that “nothing is agreed 
until everything is agreed” (Explainer, Political Declaration, 2018, p.2). This 
meant that the negotiations with regard to the future relationship would 
continue and the withdrawal agreement would not have been signed until or 
unless a political declaration was reached on the terms of the future 
relationship between the two sides (Explainer, Withdrawal Agreement, 2018 
p.2). A separate agreement is needed for determining on the conditions of a 
future relationship since it would require a negotiating process to last up for 
more than two years which is already over.  
Furthermore, it was commonly agreed by legal scholars that the two 
agreements should not have been concluded at the mean time due to the lack 
of a legal basis. Article 50 TFEU which is the legal basis for withdrawal should 
be implemented between the EU and the withdrawing Member State which 
still is a member. However, when the specific terms and the content of the 
future relationship are to be determined, the withdrawing Member State shall 
be counted officially as a third country. So that, the legal basis of this 
relationship might be a provision such as Article 207 TFEU, 218 TFEU or 271 
TFEU which relates to common commercial policy, negotiation and 
conclusion of international agreements and association agreements, 
respectively. Therefore, the withdrawal agreement and the agreement with 
regard to the future relationship are best thought to be concluded by following 
each other (Flavier & Platon, 2016; Carmona et al. 2017, p.11) as is the case 
now.  
The Withdrawal Agreement which is to be considered as an 
international treaty in its material substance comprises and seeks to clarify 
major controversial issues between the sides paving the way to the making of 
a future trade deal. The approval period of the former Withdrawal Agreement 
at home by the British Parliamentarians after its conclusion had been more 
painful than what had been envisaged by May. Among all tough issues, the 
most debatable ones could be listed as citizens’ rights, financial settlement and 
the unique situation of Northern Ireland (Explainer, Withdrawal Agreement, 
2018 pp.2-3). Yet considerable importance is to be attached to the 
circumstance in Northern Ireland which attracted much of the tension. The 
situation in Northern Ireland was regulated in May’s Withdrawal Agreement 
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within a Protocol concluded between Ireland and Northern Ireland. The hottest 
debate centred around the so-called ‘backstop clause’ introduced by the parties 
basically for the aim of avoiding a hard border between Ireland and Northern 
Ireland through fully respecting the rights enshrined in the Good Friday 
(Belfast) Agreement of 1998 (Commission Fact Sheet, Protocol Northern 
Ireland, 2018, p.1). 
The backstop clause was to be regarded as a guarantee which would 
have only entered into force in case that the parties could not have agreed on 
any other solution with regard to a future relationship till the end of the 
transition period3 corresponding to 31 December 2020. Though both the 
British and the EU side hoped that the backstop clause had never taken effect, 
it was indeed provided for hindering the most negative outcomes of a Brexit 
to have taken place without any future trade deal (Wright & Naselli, 2018). 
The backstop clause set out a single EU-UK customs territory in which there 
would have been no tariffs, quotas, or controls between the two sides. In that 
regard, EU’s Customs Code and certain pieces of legislation with regard to 
EU’s Internal Market would have continued to be applied to Northern Ireland 
to avoid a hard border (Commission Fact Sheet, Protocol Northern Ireland, 
2018, p.1). The most disliked point with regard to the backstop clause was if 
it had entered into force, it might have restricted the UK’s ability to conclude 
trade agreements with third countries since the country would still have 
remained in a customs union relationship with the EU (Wright & Naselli, 
2018). The facts that the backstop clause had been envisaged for an indefinite 
period and that the exit had been set to be conditional upon the approval of the 
EU were interpreted as conditions which were likely to trap the UK in the 
EU’s customs territory (Kentish, 2019). 
A second crucial matter to be dealt with May’s Withdrawal Agreement 
was the clarification of the future rights and duties of both UK citizens living 
in the EU Member States and European citizens who had settled in the UK. 
Part Two of May’s Withdrawal Agreement laid down Citizens’ Rights to be 
applied particularly during the transition period. Individuals rightfully needed 
to be guaranteed that their rights would be protected and ensured legal 
certainty under the Withdrawal Agreement. In that respect, all the UK citizens 
legally residing in any of the Member States as well as all European citizens 
                                                        
3 Transition period which is often referred to by the British side as “implementation period” 
aims to provide time to the parties to reach a compromise on a future trade deal after the 
withdrawal. So that, the UK shall still be bound to the EU’s rules and be subject to the ECJ’s 
case law to the degree that it is regulated under the Withdrawal Agreement. See, Taylor, C. 
(2018, October 22). Brexit Explained: What is the Transition Period and Why is it so 
Important? Irish Times. 
https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/europe/brexit-explained-what-is-the-transition-
period-and-why-is-it-so-important-1.3671622. 
European Scientific Journal June 2020 edition Vol.16, No.17 ISSN: 1857-7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857-7431 
15 
legally residing in the UK at the end of the transition period would still be 
entitled to remain in their host states. The same rights should apply to their 
family members residing at the host state by 31 December 2020 (Explainer, 
Withdrawal Agreement, 2018, p.8).  Citizens of both parties who had been 
legally and continuously residing in their host countries for five years at the 
end of the transition period should be granted a right of permanent residence 
in their host countries. Individuals belonging to both parties including 
workers, self-employed people or frontier workers all should be provided the 
same rights and protected in terms of the principle of equal treatment, free 
movement, mutual recognition of professional qualifications and social 
security benefits (Explainer, Withdrawal Agreement, 2018, pp.8-11). 
Another controversial issue between the parties related to the 
clarification of the jurisdiction of the ECJ. The UK and the EU eventually 
agreed that the UK would continue to be bound with the ECJ’s jurisdiction 
during the transition period and in some certain circumstances, beyond. UK 
courts would be able to ask for a preliminary ruling from the ECJ for matters 
concerning the interpretation of the Citizens’ Rights part of the Withdrawal 
Agreement for eight years from the exit day (Explainer, Withdrawal 
Agreement, 2018, pp.11-12). 
The next debatable issue concerned the financial settlement of the 
parties on matters related to the divorce. The financial settlement between the 
parties concerned both the UK’s financial commitments to the EU and the 
EU’s financial commitments to the UK. The Withdrawal Agreement 
particularly set out and clarified the financial obligations of the UK that it had 
undertaken earlier under the EU budget plan for the period 2014-2020. With 
regard to 2019-2020, the share of the UK would be calculated in accordance 
with the methodology exercised for its annual EU budget contributions. 
Payments to be made after the end of the transition period would be calculated 
according to the UK’s average share of contributions to the EU budget for the 
period 2014-2020 (Explainer, Withdrawal Agreement, 2018, pp.30-31). In 
that respect, the UK’s financial commitments yet far from being certain, were 
estimated to range between £ 35-39 billion. The UK would continue to 
contribute for the same period to the European Development Fund as well as 
EU Trust Funds and the Facility for refugees in Turkey. Another set of 
liabilities on the UK side covered the pensions and employee benefits of the 
members and staff of the European institutions.  The UK was expected to 
contribute to these pension rights to have risen before or at the end of the 
transition period. Concerning the EU’s major commitments, the UK would 
also be reimbursed for its paid-in capital share in European Investment Bank 
and European Central Bank over a certain period as had been agreed in the 
Withdrawal Agreement (Explainer, Withdrawal Agreement, 2018, pp.30-32). 
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The Withdrawal Agreement concluded during May’s term of office 
due to disagreement with regard to these controversial issues was rejected 
three consecutive times at the House of Commons. On the first vote held on 
15 January 2019, 202 MPs voted in favour of the Withdrawal Agreement with 
432 MPs voting against. In the following vote held on 12 March 2019, 242 
MPs voted in favour of the Agreement with 391 MPs voting against. In the 
third and the final vote of 29 March 2019, the difference between the two sides 
decreased to only 58 votes with 286 votes in favour and 344 votes against. It’s 
seen that the number of conservative MPs who voted in favour of the 
Withdrawal Agreement raised on a gradual basis from 196 recorded in the 1st 
vote up to 277 within the last vote (Brexit: MPs reject, BBC News, 2019). 
Yet, still this number was not sufficient for Theresa May to pass the 
Withdrawal Agreement from the British Parliament. May tried to renegotiate 
the Agreement with the EU in order to provide some more guarantees in terms 
of the hotly debated issues. However, the EU officials as well as political 
leaders of some major Member States such as France, already announced that 
the Withdrawal Agreement was not open to any renegotiation. In other words, 
the EU was not open to any reconsideration unless the UK totally changed its 
political line (Henley, 2019). In that regard, Theresa May, particularly due to 
failing to pass the Withdrawal Agreement and deliver Brexit, decided to resign 
both from her post as Prime Minister and from Tory leadership officially on 7  
June 2019 (Mackrell, 2019). 
A further point to raise is the difficulty in catching up with the official 
British withdrawal dates due to the long-standing controversies having been 
unresolved in the context of the Withdrawal Agreement. UK’s first official 
leave date from the EU which was expected to take place on 29 March 2019, 
was initially shifted to 12 April and then finally to 31 October 2019. Theresa 
May remained as Prime Minister until her successor Boris Johnson, -a major 
name for leave side during Brexit referendum campaigns- took office as the 
new Prime Minister of the UK on 24 July 2019. 
The Withdrawal Agreement eventually concluded between Johnson’s 
government and the EU passed within such a limited period of time from the 
British Parliament with 621 to 49 votes in favour of the Agreement.  However, 
the revised Withdrawal Agreement is considered largely to be built on May’s 
Withdrawal Agreement except a few significant issues particularly concerning 
the situation of Northern Ireland. In other words, it does not bring forward 
major changes to May’s agreement (O’Carroll, 2019). According to Article 4 
of the Protocol on Ireland and Northern Ireland included in Johnson’s revised 
Withdrawal Agreement (Revised Protocol, 2019), Northern Ireland shall 
remain as a part of the customs territory of the UK. However, Northern Ireland 
shall also be bound with a comprehensive list of EU law rules enshrined in the 
Annex II of this Protocol as well as Article 30 TFEU prohibiting any customs 
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duties and charges having equivalent effect on imports and exports between 
Member States and Article 110 TEFU prohibiting any internal taxation to be 
imposed on products of other Member States in accordance with Article 5 of 
the revised Protocol. The same article also provides that quantitative 
restrictions on imports and exports shall be prohibited between Northern 
Ireland and the EU. To put it differently, Northern Ireland shall leave the EU’s 
customs union with the UK. However, it will still partially be attached to the 
Internal Market of the EU. This significant arrangement is interpreted by some 
scholars as one of the major reasons behind Johnson’s winning the deal. The 
main difference between May’s deal and Johnson’s deal lies with this 
arrangement which precisely guarantees that the UK does not remain in a 
customs union relationship with the EU. As rightfully pointed out by Walker 
(2019) this might look officially true in legal terms but not fully functionable 
under practical terms. Yet, the time will show how it will proceed. 
 
7.  The Scenario of Exiting from the EU without any Withdrawal 
Agreement  
Yet, the prospect of a “no-deal” or “hard Brexit” did not come true. 
However, within the coming into office of Johnson, it’s undebatable that at 
least for some time it had become a serious likelihood for the UK to crash out 
of the EU without a deal. Though the House of Commons voted by 312 to 308 
votes in mid-March 2019 to reject a no-deal Brexit (House of Commons vote, 
British Parliament, 2019), still this was considered as a real possibility. It is 
fair to suggest that this ‘worst of all possibility’ would be likely to have severe 
effects concerning several aspects of the relationship if it had turned out to be 
true. Yet, in this part, the likely outcomes of what it would look like if the UK 
had exited from the EU without any withdrawal agreement shall be analyzed. 
According to Berglund (2006) the costs of withdrawal for the withdrawing 
state depends particularly on the fact whether or not that state is successful in 
concluding a beneficial agreement with the EU while leaving. In other cases, 
it definitely seems to be costlier when a withdrawal agreement cannot be 
reached between the sides and the state decides to withdraw unilaterally 
(p.162). 
One shall remember that indeed Theresa May had put forward a tough 
stance with respect to a no-deal possibility when she said through her famous 
words that “a no-deal is better than a bad deal” in the early days of the 
negotiation process. Taking such a stance, she emphasized that her 
government would not allow the EU to urge and to force a bad deal that was 
not in line with British national interests or economy (Dominiczak, 2017). 
Long after this discourse and short before she had resigned, May said in an 
interview that her words were expressed in terms of the abstract and yet the 
Withdrawal Agreement concluded between the parties was indeed a good deal 
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for the country (Isaby, 2019). Yet, according to some commentators, it still 
remains unclear whether or not Theresa May in the very beginning had put it 
seriously or just tried to invoke it as a tactic for negotiations (Mc Kee, 2018). 
Several reports and scenarios during the last four years have been put forward 
by many institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Bank of 
England and Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) with a view to assessing 
the likely disastrous effects of Brexit particularly on economy and trade. Yet, 
it is not possible to fully cover the likely catastrophic effects of a no-deal 
scenario on economy and particularly the financial sector of the UK within the 
limited scope of this paper if that prospect had come out to be true. Still it’s 
significant to try to investigate the likely negative consequences of a no-deal 
scenario in order to fully enlighten the whole process and to comprehend how 
much worse things could have gotten if the highly criticized Withdrawal 
Agreement had not entered into force.  
First of all, it’s crucial to note that there would have been no transition 
period in case that the UK had left the EU without a Withdrawal Agreement. 
This would have meant that the EU law would have immediately ceased to 
apply in the country starting from the exit day. According to the early 
projections put forward by the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR), in 
case that the UK had left the EU without a deal, this would have been likely 
to hit British economy into a recession towards the early 2020. Roughly, a no-
deal scenario even with a positive approach, would have been likely to cause 
the GDP of the UK to fall by 2 % while triggering the unemployment above 5 
% through the end of 2020. These might have been accompanied by a 
comprehensive reduction in tax revenues and a major increase in national debt 
of the country. The OBR estimated that the growing ambiguity and 
diminishing confidence on the area of investment and trade in the country 
might have paved the way for a recession as disastrous as the one challenged 
during the 1990’s (Elliot, 2019). It would have been unsurprising that the fall 
in tax revenues had been likely to lead to the reduction of funds dedicated for 
health and social care (Mc Kee, 2018). 
A highly significant and yet unclear issue was whether or not the UK 
would still have been honoring its financial commitments in case of leaving 
the EU without a deal. In such a situation, the UK’s financial contributions to 
the EU budget would have fallen to zero starting from the exit day. Darvas 
(2019) put forward some calculations according to what might have happened 
in terms of the non-payment of the exit fee if a no-deal scenario had taken 
place. Though he considered the amount of the exit fee to be low in 
comparison to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) both for the EU Member States 
and the UK sides, still he accepted that in such a circumstance, this financial 
gap as referred to “Brexit hole” in the EU budget would have to be filled 
particularly by the contributions of the rest EU 27 Member States. Wolff 
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(2019) emphasized that indeed this gap would have to be filled by the EU’s 
existing ‘own resources’ ceiling which would have been transferred to the EU 
budget by the Member States in accordance with their Gross National Incomes 
(GNI) (pp.1-3). Yet, Darvas (2019) pointed out to a possibility that even in the 
absence of a Withdrawal Agreement, the UK might still have chosen to 
comply with its financial liabilities for revealing its goodwill in terms of not 
losing any possibility of making a good trade deal with the EU in the future. 
If the UK had honored its financial liabilities, then the sides might still have 
made a cooperation on urgent matters even in the case of withdrawal without 
a deal. Otherwise, the EU might have perceived this as a hostile step whose 
consequences might have been more troublesome (Wolff, 2019, pp.1-3). 
Leaving without a deal was likely to have one of its most immediate 
negative outcomes with regard to the trade relationship between the parties. 
Taking into consideration that both the UK and the EU were engaged in such 
a highly intertwining trade relationship due to British membership, a no-deal 
situation would have had immediate severe effects in trade relations. It was 
interesting to note that Dominic Raab -the new foreign secretary of Britain- 
had been urging British companies to expand their export area beyond 
European market particularly to Asia (Walker, 2019). More interesting than 
that was what he had been offering in terms of a no-deal Brexit when he had 
claimed that a no-deal exit indeed would have been likely to facilitate the 
negotiation and bargaining processes of a future free trade deal with the EU 
(Rankin, 2019). However, this claim was not accepted by the EU side as well 
as many scholars working in the field.   
As indicated earlier, the volume of the trade relationship between the 
sides is quite large and it is doubtless that Brexit is likely to have an inevitable 
negative impact under each scenario in comparison to preserving the full 
membership. Yet, the UK most probably would have started to implement the 
World Trade Organization’s (WTO) most-favoured nation tariffs immediately 
if it had left the EU without a withdrawal deal. However, that possibility still 
might come true if the UK and the EU will not be able to reach a compromise 
on the nature of their future trade relationship till the end of the transition 
period that corresponds to the end of 2020. A withdrawal with no-deal would 
have been likely to produce immediate challenges with regard to logistics and 
administration. Both sides would have had to recruit new personnel for taking 
charge in customs controls, veterinary, sanitary and phytosanitary checks 
(Wolff, 2019, pp.4-6). Keeping in mind that the EU is the biggest trading 
partner of the UK, these issues which seem to have been quite challenging to 
overcome are to be laid down under the terms of a future trade relationship 
between the sides in the short run. 
One of the most significant outcomes which interestingly might have 
also been considered as one of the main reasons behind a withdrawal without 
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a deal had concerned the border between the UK and Ireland. The backstop 
clause might have been the major incentive for British parliamentarians to 
reject May’s Withdrawal Agreement. On the other hand, as rightfully argued 
by Wolff, this rejection most probably resulting in a no-deal withdrawal 
paradoxically would have necessitated customs controls at the border which 
had been aimed to be prevented with the backstop clause (Wolff, 2019, p.6). 
Another outcome of leaving without a deal had been likely to arise 
with regard to the national health sector of the UK. Spencer (2019) made a 
reference to a Health Policy paper which stated that all scenarios with regard 
to Brexit, had indicated that the workforce of the national health sector would 
have been likely to diminish, yet the care for British citizens who had settled 
in the EU Member States would have seemed to be bizarre as well as the 
situation of accessibility to medicines, vaccines and devices (p.848). McKee 
(2018) also underlined that a no-deal outcome would have immediately 
deprived the UK’s medical sector of the EU’s large-scale funding 
opportunities. This would furthermore have had a negative impact on the 
mobility and cooperation of high-skilled international academicians as well as 
students in this sector. The increase of national health care spending due to fall 
in tax revenues, had been likely to lead to restrictions in spending within other 
policy fields (Lea, 2018, p.4). Yet, the significance of supporting and 
strengthening the health sector and the right to health as a fundamental right 
have unfortunately been experienced quite severely during the Covid-19 
pandemic throughout the whole World, but particularly in the UK. 
A further negative impact was likely to be revealed in the agri-food 
sector. The hit in this sector was likely to lead to shortages of major food 
products and also higher prices for consumers. This would have been caused 
by the high customs tariffs to be imposed between the sides and their 
additional costs as well as the veterinary checks to be conducted at the border 
(Mc Kee, 2018). 
Last but not the least, the situation of the citizens of both parties was 
another significant topic to be dealt with. British citizens in case of a no-deal 
withdrawal immediately would have been counted as third country citizens to 
whom Council Regulation (EU) 2018/18064 had been needed to be applied. 
For the sake of preserving the acquired rights of both British citizens living 
and working in EU Member States as well as European citizens living and 
working in the UK, the parties should have tried to seek ways for reaching a 
compromise for the most effective solution particularly in the fields related to 
social security and pension transferability (Wolff, 2019, pp.6-7). 
                                                        
4  Regulation (EU) 2018/1806 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 November 
2018 listing the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing 
the external borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement, 
PE/50/2018/REV/1, OJ L 303, 28.11.2018, p. 39–58. 
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One has to note that the immediately affected sectors in case of a 
withdrawal without a deal should not have been the ones limited to those 
mentioned above. However, also it has to be underlined that the European 
Commission tried to make all the necessary rapid preparations and submit 
emergency drafts with regard to several sectors in order to avoid troublesome 
outcomes (Wolff, 2019, p.7). 
As said earlier, a no-deal scenario after so long-lasting efforts and 
negotiation processes conducted between the UK and the EU for the last three 
and a half years till January 2020, would have seemed to put everything in 
vain. McKee (2018) pointed out to a report that had been prepared by the 
House of Lords which could be summarized shortly in one sentence. 
According to that, “a no-deal consequence was most probably the worst of all 
other scenarios for the UK”. Therefore, the terms and conditions of the 
Withdrawal Agreement shall better be read and evaluated only after 
elaborating on the possible negative effects of a past no-deal situation in order 
to achieve a more efficient and effective understanding.  
 
8.  A Brief Overview of the Negotiations during the Covid-19 
Pandemic 
On the other side one shall still keep in mind that the fact that a no-
deal scenario did not come true for the first level of the game does not mean 
that there exists no such further possibility within the second level of the same 
game. The negotiations conducted between the UK and the EU still heavily 
carry the risk of being concluded without any trade deal at the end of the 
transition period. As mentioned earlier, this shall mean that the UK might start 
to trade with the EU on WTO terms by the start of 2021 unless a further 
extension is not demanded or provided (Landler & Castle, 2020). 
Currently both the UK and the EU side have been negotiating through 
video conference calls in terms of setting up a new trade deal as well as 
determining on the conditions and terms of their future relationship. The sides’ 
relationship has already been deteriorated by the impacts of Covid-19 
pandemic which has emerged as a disastrous nightmare still affecting the 
whole World countries. It’s undeniable that the Brexit negotiations between 
the sides have lost their priorities when the new agenda was replaced by the 
Coronavirus pandemic and the ways to struggle with it (Landler & Castle, 
2020). 
The on-going negotiations yet provide little evidence on whether or 
not the sides will be able to conclude a deal before December 31, 2020. The 
British government seems to avoid asking for any extension of the transition 
period. As rightfully put forward by Conley (2020) the Withdrawal Agreement 
does not provide itself the opportunity to ask for a further extension of the 
transition period unless it is changed. The EU officials state that the sides were 
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unsuccessful in making any significant progress so far. Johnson’s government 
seeks to catch up a more distant and independent relationship with the EU. 
This largely seems to contradict with the EU’s approach which seeks to 
guarantee a level playing field particularly through providing that the UK will 
still remain to be bound with EU state aid rules (Sandford, 2020; Boffey, 
2020). 
There are still several other topics which are hotly debated between the 
two parties. According to the EU side, the British side has been moving too 
slow in guaranteeing minimum levels of standards with regard to areas such 
as environment, workers’ rights as well as the protection of personal data. 
Moreover, the EU keeps insisting on that the UK should continue 
implementing the European Convention on Human Rights through 
incorporating it into its national legal system and the disputes should be 
resolved by the European Court of Justice. This is not accepted by the British 
side since it is not willing to be bound by a foreign court’s decisions. The UK 
also considers that the EU has been treating third countries such as Canada 
more favorably in comparison to what it has been offered as an ex-member in 
terms of a trade deal.  The UK also is unlikely to allow the EU Member States 
to have access to its fishing stocks which is another unresolved issue between 
the parties (Conley, 2020). 
According to some commentators, the Covid-19 pandemic and its 
expected catastrophic effects on economies, might even lead the British 
government to seek for a far more independent relationship with the EU for 
reshaping its economy and coping against the global recession. This might 
eventually increase the possibility for the UK and the EU trade talks to be 
concluded without any trade deal (Landler & Castle, 2020). Considering that 
the Conservatives and particularly Johnson has come out of the December 
2019 elections with holding such a large majority in the new British 
Parliament ever since Margaret Thatcher’s election, there no longer seems any 
need to arrive at a compromise with the EU for guaranteeing the British 
Parliament’s support (Conley, 2020) which is likely to put the situation into 
more difficulty. Some commentators even suggest that the likely negative 
outcomes of Brexit will be overshadowed by the larger negative impacts of 
the coronavirus on economies notably British economy, so that it would 
almost become impossible to recognize any difference (Landler & Castle, 
2020). British citizens would be unlikely to make a division between the 
disastrous economic ramifications of Covid-19 and the economic hardship 
caused by being subject to WTO tariff schedules under a likely no-deal or a 
minimum deal scenario which accounts for an almost no-deal (Conley, 2020). 
Therefore, all what have been mentioned above, accompanied by the red lines 
of both sides have unfortunately raised serious concerns in terms of a no-deal 
scenario at the end of 2020 (Sandford, 2020; Boffey, 2020). 




It is undoubted that the year 2020 shall be reminded as a year full of 
remarkable events even when the first half is considered. Early this year, one 
of the strongest Member States of the EU officially became an ex-member 
which happened for the first time in the EU integration history. This was 
significant in terms of being the first case of withdrawal, however it was more 
striking that the country closing the door behind was also one of the wealthiest 
and powerful members of the EU which at the end of the day would mean a 
lot for the whole European integration project. 
This study sought to briefly analyse the legal, political as well as 
economic consequences of this divorce process from a general view by 
particularly trying to focus on the details of the most controversial aspects of 
what had been negotiated between the sides on the table. Moreover, a 
comprehensive comparison has been drawn between the outcomes of exiting 
from the EU with a withdrawal agreement and without any deal. The outcomes 
reveal that the Brexit process which has started four years ago shall not be as 
easy -for particularly the UK part- as it was envisaged to be. The whole process 
already seems to be sufficiently rocky ranging from the legal outcomes to the 
economic ones which under each scenario are likely to encounter serious 
negative impacts in comparison to preserving the full membership. Yet, the 
sides are divorced and the clock has this time been ticking for setting up a new 
trade relationship until the end of this year which shall most probably be no 
easier than the first round of negotiations.   
However, this historic experience has shown certain lessons to be 
drawn for other Member States of the EU. Though, there is still little evidence 
suggesting what price is to be paid in terms of Brexit both by the UK and the 
EU side, at least, what is clear is that the UK within this process unfortunately 
understood that it could not still have its cake and eat it as it was used to during 
the last 47 years of this marriage. 
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